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Revisiting the Scrap Heap:                                               
The Decline and Fall of Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co. 
PARKER B. POTTER, JR.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the more difficult tasks facing a federal court is trying to pre-
dict how a state’s highest court would rule on a question of law it has not 
yet addressed.1  That difficulty is well illustrated by the history of Wenners 
v. Great State Beverages, Inc.,2 and in particular, the interpretation of that 
opinion contained in Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co.3   
Smith’s interpretation of Wenners is highlighted by its footnote number 
eleven, and while footnote eleven is no footnote four,4 it is a notable state-
ment in its own right: 
  
 *  The author, a United States District Court law clerk and Adjunct Professor at Franklin Pierce 
Law Center, holds a J.D. from Pierce Law (1999); a Ph.D. in Anthropology from Brown University 
(1989); and a B.A. in English and French from Washington & Lee University (1979). 
 1. Of course, to resolve the thorniest of those issues, the ones that sprout in truly unplowed ground, 
a federal court can certify a question of law to a state’s highest court. 
 2. 663 A.2d 623 (N.H. 1995). 
 3. 76 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 4. Footnote four of U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), is, arguably, the most 
influential footnote in American jurisprudence. 
 
Nothing could be easier than to collect tributes to the footnote’s great fame.  Justice Powell 
called it “the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.”  For Peter Linzer, it is “the 
most famous footnote in constitutional law.”  In his entry on the footnote in the Encyclope-
dia of American Constitutional Law, Aviam Soifer calls it “undoubtedly . . . the best known, 
most controversial footnote in constitutional law.”  Michael Dorff and Samuel Isacharoff go 
further, calling it “the most famous footnote in all of law.”  Geoffrey Miller says that “any 
second-year law student knows” it to be “the most renowned footnote in constitutional his-
tory.”  Thomas Simon calls it “notorious.”  Morton Horwitz just calls it “famous.”  J.M. 
Balkin calls it simply “The Footnote” and can be sure his readers understand the reference. 
 
Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. Tex.  
L. Rev. 163, 168-69 (2004) (quoting Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 Colum.  
L. Rev. 1087, 1087 (1982); Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position 
of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely v. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 Const. Comment. 177, 
177 (1995); Aviam Soifer, Footnote Four in United States v. Carolene Products Company, Ency. of 
Am. Constitutional L. 213-14 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., Macmillan Publg. Co. 1986); Michael C. 
Dorff & Samuel Isacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 923, 926 
(2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. 397, 397 (1987); 
Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 107, 123 (1990); 
Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 
252 (Oxford U. Press 1992); J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, Nw. U. L. Rev. 275, 275 (1989)). 
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To the extent that either Kopf v. Chloride Power Electronics, Inc., 
882 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-90 (D.N.H. 1995), or Godfrey v. Perkin-
Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (D.N.H. 1992), hold other-
wise, Wenners [v. Great State Beverages, Inc., 663 A.2d 623 (N.H. 
1995)] consigns them to the scrap heap.5 
The portion of Wenners that, in the view of the Smith majority,6 abrogated 
Kopf and Godfrey is the statement that “a plaintiff may not pursue a com-
mon law remedy where the legislature intended to replace it with a statu-
tory cause of action.”7  While that statement seems simple enough, there is 
more to Smith’s reference to Wenners than meets the eye.   
This article begins with a close examination of Wenners and the two 
opinions on which Wenners relied for its now-canonical statement of the 
relationship between statutory and common law remedies.  I continue with 
a discussion of Smith and the two opinions that Wenners purportedly con-
signed to the scrap heap.  The next section explores the two distinctly dif-
ferent shadows cast by Wenners, one in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Hampshire, the other in the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court.  I conclude by suggesting that, in light of Bliss v. Stow Mills, Inc.,8 
the scrap heap may be due for a changing of the guard, with Smith replac-
ing Godfrey. 
II. WENNERS AND ITS PRECURSORS 
In Wenners, the plaintiff, David Wenners, was an employee of the de-
fendant, Great State Beverages (“Great State”).9  After Wenners declared 
personal bankruptcy, “[t]he chief executive officer of Great State and/or 
his son, the president of Great State, asked [Wenners]  to turn over assets 
to either or both of them in contravention of a bankruptcy court order, 
which [Wenners] refused to do.”10  As a result, he was fired.11  In response, 
  
 5. Smith, 76 F.3d at 429 n. 11. 
 6. Judge Selya wrote the majority opinion.  Judge Bownes wrote a concurring opinion because he 
was “troubled by the analysis used in deciding the Title VII claim,” id. at 429 (Bownes, J., concurring), 
but his concurrence says nothing about Wenners or the wrongful discharge claim, leading to the pre-
sumption that he concurred with both the result reached in Judge Selya’s opinion, and the reasoning 
that led to the result. 
 7. 663 A.2d at 625 (citing Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980); Thomp-
son v. Forest, 614 A.2d 1064, 1065-66 (N.H. 1992)). 
 8. 786 A.2d 815 (N.H. 2001). 
 9. 663 A.2d at 625. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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he filed suit, asserting a claim for wrongful termination.12  Under the 
common law of New Hampshire, both today and at the time Wenners was 
decided, a plaintiff claiming wrongful termination has the burden of prov-
ing: 
[O]ne, that the employer terminated the employment out of bad 
faith, malice, or retaliation; and two, that the employer terminated 
the employment because the employee performed acts which pub-
lic policy would encourage or because he refused to perform acts 
which public policy would condemn.13 
According to Wenners, he had a claim for wrongful termination because 
“his termination was the result of his bankruptcy filing and/or his refusal to 
comply with the demands to turn over the assets.”14 
Great State moved to dismiss, arguing, in part, that Wenners was 
barred from bringing a common law claim because: (1) “where a statutory 
remedy exists, no common law cause of action can lie;”15 and (2) Wenners 
had “a valid statutory remedy under the United States Bankruptcy Code.”16  
The superior court denied Great State’s motion to dismiss,17 and Great 
State filed an interlocutory appeal.18  The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
affirmed.19   
In his opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Horton characterized 
Great State’s argument in the following way: “The defendant, citing How-
ard v. Dorr Woolen Company, . . . argues that where a statutory remedy 
exists, no common law cause of action can lie.”20  In affirming the trial 
court, the Supreme Court did not adopt the defendant’s statement of the 
law – i.e., that the mere existence of a statutory remedy precludes a com-
  
 12. Id. at 624.  Courts appear to use the terms “wrongful termination” and “wrongful discharge” 
interchangeably. 
 13. Id. at 625 (citing Short v. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 16, 612 A.2d 364, 370 (N.H. 1992)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. (citing Howard, 414 A.2d at 1274). 
 16. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 525(b) (1988)).  Regarding the content of those statutory 
provisions: 
 
Section 525(b) bars private employers from terminating or discriminating with respect to the 
employment of a debtor or bankrupt under the act solely because such debtor or bankrupt 
has filed for bankruptcy, failed to pay a debt that is dischargeable, or been discharged under 
the act.  11 U.S.C. § 525(b).  Section 105(a) permits the bankruptcy court to “issue any or-
der, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the 
Bankruptcy Code].” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
 
Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 626. 
 20. Id. at 625 (citation omitted). 
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mon law cause of action – holding, instead, that “[w]hile a plaintiff may 
not pursue a common law remedy where the legislature intended to replace 
it with a statutory cause of action,”21 the case before it involved “no clear 
statutory intent to supplant the common law cause of action.”22  After re-
jecting Great State’s preclusion argument, the Court went on to separately 
analyze, and reject, Great State’s argument that Wenners’s wrongful ter-
mination claim was preempted by federal bankruptcy law.23 
For the rule that a plaintiff has no common law remedy when the legis-
lature intended to replace such a remedy with a statutory cause of action, 
the Court cited both Howard,24 another wrongful termination case,25 and 
Thompson v. Forest,26 a negligence case that implicated the statutory tort 
claim bar incorporated into the New Hampshire workers’ compensation 
statute.27  But before turning to Howard and Thompson, there are four 
points to make about Wenners.   
First, the rule stated by the Court in Wenners was not the rule proposed 
by the defendant; Great State’s rule required only the existence of a statu-
tory remedy to abrogate the common law, not an expression of legislative 
intent to supplant the common law.28  Second, because the Bankruptcy 
Code provided no statutory remedy for David Wenners, Great State could 
  
 21. Id. (citations omitted). 
 22. Id. (emphasis added, citation omitted).  In so holding, the Court explained that “‘Section 525(b) 
[of the Bankruptcy Code] provides no remedy for violation by a private employer,’ . . . nor does it set 
forth procedures or refer to any other section of the Code.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, § 525(b) 
failed to satisfy not only the rule stated by the Court in Wenners (that there is no common law remedy 
when the legislature intended to replace it with a statutory cause of action), but also the more defen-
dant-friendly rule proposed by Great State and rejected by the Court (the existence of a statutory rem-
edy eliminates the availability of a common law cause of action). 
 23. Id. at 625-26. 
 24. Id. at 625. 
 25. Howard, 414 A.2d at 1273. 
 26. Wenners, 663 A.2d at 625. 
 27. Thompson, 614 A.2d at 1065. 
 28. Unlike some legal hair-splitting, this is a distinction with a difference, as there are some areas of 
the law in which common law and statutory remedies do co-exist.  For example, in New Hampshire, 
“[i]ndividuals injured by unfair trade practices may seek a remedy for [such] injury under common law 
or other New Hampshire statutes; they need not seek a remedy under the [New Hampshire Consumer 
Protection Act].”  Transmedia Rest. Co. v. Devereaux, 821 A.2d 983, 991 (N.H. 2003) (construing 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:12 (1995)) (citations omitted).  Thus, the mere existence of a statutory 
remedy is legally inadequate to eliminate a common law cause of action.   
  Given that statutory enactments can explicitly abrogate common law rights, as in the area of 
workers’ compensation, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8 (1999 & Supp. 2001), can contain a clause 
that saves common law causes of action, as in the areas of consumer protection, see N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 358-A:12, and whistleblower protection, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275-E:5 (1999), or can be 
silent on the question of the relation between statutory and common law rights, an interesting question 
arises concerning statutes that fall into the third category, and whether their enactment, without more, 
expresses a legislative intent to replace a common law remedy with a statutory cause of action.  But see 
Niemi v. Boston & Me. R.R., 173 A. 361, 366 (N.H. 1934) (“The legislative purpose is that the common 
law shall be maintained except as its change is ordered, and the purpose to change should fairly ap-
pear.”). 
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not even satisfy the precondition for invoking its own rule, making it un-
necessary for the Court even to state its more stringent one, and seemingly 
casting that statement into the category of dictum.29  Third, after it rejected 
Great State’s argument that Wenners’s common law cause of action was 
precluded by the existence of a statutory remedy, the Court conducted a 
separate preemption analysis.30  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, 
appearances and subsequent history to the contrary,31 the rule stated in and 
attributed to Wenners is not, and could not be, a statement of the common 
law of New Hampshire.  Rather, it is merely a legal truism derived from 
the inherent power of the legislature to abrogate the common law.32  On 
that basis, it was unnecessary, and perhaps unnecessarily confusing, for the 
opinion in Wenners to cite Howard and Thompson as authorities for its 
superfluous legal truism. 
In Howard, the defendant did win dismissal of the plaintiffs’ common 
law wrongful discharge claims – and held its judgment on appeal – but not 
through application of the rule attributed to Howard by the Wenners Court.  
“The principal issue [in Howard was] whether either the widow or estate of 
the decedent [was] entitled to damages, including the value of a group term 
life insurance policy, for an alleged wrongful discharge by the defen-
dant.”33  The administrator of the decedent’s estate alleged, inter alia, “that 
the defendant discharged [the decedent] because of his age [and] his suffer-
ing from a debilitating case of angina.”34   
Regarding the administrator’s claim that the decedent had been termi-
nated because of his age and ill health, the Supreme Court held: 
We also find the administrator’s reliance upon Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Co., [316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974)], for the proposition that a 
discharge due to age or sickness warrants recovery is misplaced.  
We construe Monge to apply only to a situation where an em-
ployee is discharged because he performed an act that public pol-
icy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy 
  
 29. The Wenners rule appears to be dictum because Great State’s argument did not fail due to the 
existence of a statutory cause of action intended by Congress to co-exist with common law remedies; it 
failed because the Bankruptcy Code provides no private remedies whatever.   
 30. Wenners, 663 A.2d at 625-26. 
 31. See e.g. Bliss, 786 A.2d at 820 (referring to “the common law rule cited in Wenners”). 
 32. The status of the Wenners rule as a legal truism rather than an actual common law rule is per-
haps best illustrated by the fact that unlike true common law rules, which are subject to judicial revi-
sion, the Wenners rule could never be overruled by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.  That is, there 
is no circumstance – short of a legislative act undertaken in an unconstitutional way – in which the 
Supreme Court could ever rule that a plaintiff may pursue a common law remedy when the legislature 
intended to replace such a remedy with a common law cause of action. 
 33. Howard, 414 A.2d at 1273. 
 34. Id. at 1274. 
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would condemn.  See e.g. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) 
(employee discharged for accepting jury duty); cf. Whirlpool Corp. 
v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).  A discharge due to sickness does 
not fall within this category, and is generally remedied by medical 
insurance or disability provisions in an employment contract.  Nor 
does discharge because of age fall within this narrow category.  
The proper remedy for an action for unlawful age discrimination is 
provided for by statute.  See RSA 354-A:8 I (Supp.1979); RSA 
354-A:9; 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1976).  Ac-
cordingly, the administrator’s claim must fail on the basis of his 
pleadings.351  
A careful reading of Howard reveals that the rule ascribed to that opin-
ion by Wenners – a common law remedy is not available when the legisla-
ture intended to replace that remedy with a statutory cause of action – is 
nowhere to be found.  Rather, according to the Howard Court, the plain-
tiffs in that case did not state a wrongful discharge claim because the two 
“acts” by the decedent for which he was allegedly fired – getting sick and 
getting old – were not acts that public policy would encourage.  Obviously, 
the Court did mention various remedies available to those discharged on 
account of sickness or old age, but it did not say – nor could it have said – 
that the statutory cause of action for age discrimination was a legislative 
replacement for a common law wrongful discharge claim based upon age, 
because, as the Court explained, discharge due to old age simply does not 
fall into the narrow category of discharges for performing an act encour-
aged by public policy.  In other words, age-discrimination statutes are not a 
replacement for a common law remedy for wrongful discharge because 
there is no common law remedy for discharge due to old age. 
Unlike the defendant/appellant in Wenners, who cited only Howard, 
the Wenners Court also cited Thompson as a source for the rule it stated.36  
Thompson, decided about a dozen years after Howard, involved a negli-
gence claim that the defendants moved to dismiss, on grounds that it was 
barred by the workers’ compensation statute.37  The principal holding of 
Thompson is that an allegation of “willful, wanton and reckless” conduct 
by a co-employee does not state an intentional tort claim and, as a conse-
quence, is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Law.38  Along the way 
toward reaching that conclusion, the Thompson Court devoted considerable 
attention to the interplay between the common law of torts and the New 
  
 35. Id. (parallel citations omitted). 
 36. 663 A.2d at 625. 
 37. 614 A.2d at 1065-66. 
 38. Id. at 1068 (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8, I(b) (Supp. 1991)). 
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Hampshire workers’ compensation statute, explaining that “[i]n recogni-
tion of the burdens, delays, inadequate relief and unequal operation of law 
inherent in common law remedies, the Workers’ Compensation Law was 
designed to substitute for unsatisfactory remedies in tort a liability without 
fault with limited compensation capable of ready and early determina-
tion.”39  While Thompson does not state, as a general rule, that a common 
law remedy is precluded when the legislature intended to replace it with a 
statutory cause of action, such a rule is reasonably inferred from the hold-
ing in that case, which, in turn, is rooted in the Workers’ Compensation 
Law, which states the intent of the legislature that “an employee of an em-
ployer subject to this chapter shall be conclusively presumed . . . to have 
waived all rights of action whether at common law or by statute or pro-
vided under the laws of any other state or otherwise.”40   
In any event, as between Howard and Thompson, Thompson seems to 
be the more plausible source for the rule stated in Wenners.  Any sugges-
tion to the contrary, even by Justice Horton in Wenners, would appear to 
be based upon a misreading of Howard, which mentioned the availability 
of alternative remedies, some of them statutory, but simply did not turn on 
the legislature’s intent to create an exclusive statutory remedy.41  However, 
if Thompson is, indeed, the source of the rule stated in Wenners, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that the statutory replacement for common law 
remedies in Thompson explicitly bars common law causes of action, which 
at least suggests that the rule in Wenners would only apply in other situa-
tions in which a proposed statutory replacement for a common law remedy 
explicitly bars common law remedies.  
III. SMITH AND THE SCRAP HEAP 
In Smith, the opinion in which Judge Selya installed a scrap heap in 
footnote eleven, an employee who was discharged sued her former em-
ployer, asserting claims of “wrongful discharge based on gender discrimi-
nation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of con-
tract,”42 along with a claim of gender/pregnancy discrimination under Title 
VII.43  At an early stage in the proceedings, the district court granted the 
  
 39. Id. at 1066 (quoting Estabrook v. Am. Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 498 A.2d 741, 744 (N.H. 1985) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 40. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:8, I (1999). 
 41. It would be pure speculation to delve into the reasons why Justice Horton identified Howard as 
the source for a rule so well grounded in Thompson, but perhaps it seemed necessary, in a wrongful 
discharge case, to ground the rule in another wrongful discharge case. 
 42. 76 F.3d at 419. 
 43. Id. 
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defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the wrongful discharge 
claim.44  In the words of Judge Selya, “[i]n the court below, Judge Stahl 
ruled that when a statutory remedy is available, New Hampshire courts 
would not entertain a complaint that an at-will employee had been wrong-
fully discharged in violation of public policy.”45   
In affirming Judge Stahl, the Smith majority construed the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court’s disposition of the age-based wrongful discharge 
claim in Howard in the following way: “A discharge due to age fell outside 
this ‘narrow category’ [of discharges cognizable under the common law of 
wrongful discharge] inasmuch as the ‘proper remedy for an action for 
unlawful age discrimination is provided for by statute.’”46  The problem 
with that reading of Howard is that the logical linkage suggested by the 
phrase “inasmuch as” does not appear in Howard.  Rather, Howard said 
first that termination for age fell outside the narrow category of discharges 
cognizable under the rubric of wrongful discharge and then stated, entirely 
independently, that a statutory remedy was available for such discharges.  
But Howard did not say that the availability of a statutory remedy was the 
reason why a common law cause of action was foreclosed to the plaintiff in 
that case – Howard most likely would have been decided the same way 
even if a statutory remedy were not available for age discrimination – and 
the opinion in Smith said nothing, explicitly, about the intent of the New 
Hampshire legislature in enacting the state age-discrimination statute,47 or 
the intent of the United States Congress in enacting federal gender-
discrimination laws.48  In other words, the majority in Smith appears to 
have misread Howard in the same way the Wenners Court did. 
Based upon that misreading of Howard – or its reliance on Wenners – 
the Smith majority ruled that “the existence of such a [statutory] remedy 
[for gender discrimination, in the form of Title VII] preclude[d] the appel-
lant, in the circumstances of [that] case, from asserting a common law 
claim for wrongful discharge.”49  Several things are noteworthy about that 
holding.   
First, while the Smith majority accurately recited the holding from 
Wenners that “a plaintiff may not pursue a common law remedy where the 
legislature intended to replace it with a statutory cause of action,”50 its own 
holding cited to the more expansive statement of that rule, provided by the 
  
 44. Id. (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 428.  
 46. Id. (quoting Howard, 414 A.2d at 1274 (emphasis added)). 
 47. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:8, I (Supp. 1979); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:9 (1989). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626 (1976). 
 49. 76 F.3d at 429. 
 50. Id. (citation omitted). 
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defendant in Wenners, which spoke only of the existence of a statutory 
remedy, without mentioning the intention of the legislature to replace the 
common law remedy with a statutory remedy.51  Second, there was no 
need, in Smith, to invoke the rule purportedly derived from Howard by the 
Wenners Court.  Just as getting old and getting sick do not fall into the 
narrow category of circumstances covered by the tort of wrongful dis-
charge, because getting old and getting sick are not acts encouraged by 
public policy, being a woman and being pregnant also fall outside that 
category, as neither is an act encouraged by public policy.  In other words, 
the reasoning stated by the Howard Court, rather than the phantom rule 
purportedly derived from Howard by the Wenners Court, would have pro-
vided a fully adequate basis for deciding Smith.  
Third, without acknowledging the Wenners Court’s observation that in 
the case before it, there was “no clear statutory intent to supplant the com-
mon law cause of action,”52 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit appears to have derived from Wenners, albeit rather implicitly, 
a test for determining whether the legislature intended to replace a com-
mon law remedy with a statutory cause of action.  Specifically, the Smith 
majority seems to have construed the Wenners Court’s observations that 
the Bankruptcy Code provided no remedies for persons in Wenners’s posi-
tion and set forth no procedures for pursuing such remedies to be an af-
firmative statement that when the legislature does “creat[e] a private right 
of action . . . and limns a mature procedure for pursuing such an action,”53 
those legislative acts, without more, signal a legislative intent to supplant 
common law causes of action.  Whether the Wenners Court actually in-
tended to establish the rule the First Circuit ascribes to the Wenners opin-
ion is, at best, an open question, but it seems unlikely.54  Indeed, it appears 
that the Smith majority transformed one rule, common law is displaced by 
statute if the legislature so intends, into a substantially different one: com-
mon law is displaced by any statute in which the legislature does not state 
its intention not to displace the common law.  Among other things, Smith’s 
  
 51. Id. 
 52. Wenners, 663 A.2d at 625. 
 53. Smith, 76 F.3d at 429. 
 54. Logically speaking, the Smith majority took “if not x, then not y” to mean “if x, then y,” but of 
course those two statements are not logical equivalents.  If an object is not a fruit, it is surely not an 
apple, but just because an object is a fruit, that alone is not enough to make it an apple.  Applied to the 
particulars of Smith and Wenners, a legislature that creates no statutory remedy plainly does not intend 
to replace a common law remedy with a statutory one, but, on the other hand, a legislature can create a 
statutory remedy without intending for that statutory remedy to replace any other remedies available 
under the common law.  Because of the logical fallacy in the Smith analysis, the opinion stopped short 
of determining, under preemption principles, whether Congress intended for Title VII to replace any 
common law remedies that might be available under state law. 
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test for “statutory preclusion”55 sets a lower threshold for finding legisla-
tive intent to replace common law remedies than standard preemption prin-
ciples set for finding Congressional intent to supplant state law.  While the 
doctrine of preemption requires Congress to clearly signal its intent to sup-
plant state law, the Smith test allows preclusion unless the legislature ex-
pressly disclaims any preclusive intent.  Had the Smith majority paid more 
attention to Thompson, which is the only plausible source of case law sup-
port for the Wenners rule,56 it might not have been so quick, in the context 
of Title VII, to take away Smith’s common law cause of action.  Thompson 
involved a statute with a provision that expressly displaced common law 
remedies.  Title VII, the statute at issue in Smith, contains no such provi-
sion.57   
In addition to invoking the Wenners rule when it could have, and 
probably should have relied upon the reasoning of Howard, Smith states, in 
footnote eleven, that Wenners consigned Kopf and Godfrey “to the scrap 
heap,” to the extent either of those opinions contained holdings that were 
contrary to Wenners.58  Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of 
whether the Wenners dictum has the power to consign anything to the 
scrap heap, there is the further question of just how much of Kopf and 
Godfrey remain after Smith.  As between Kopf and Godfrey, Judge De-
vine’s decision in Godfrey appears to have taken a bigger hit from footnote 
eleven than his decision in Kopf.   
In Godfrey, an employee complained of sexual harassment and sued 
her employer and three of its employees, asserting a claim under Title VII 
as well as state law claims for wrongful discharge, intentional and negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, and slander.59  The defendants moved 
to dismiss the wrongful discharge claim – which was premised upon a con-
structive discharge arising from a hostile work environment – arguing “that 
a wrongful discharge claim cannot be premised upon a public policy em-
bodied in a statute which provides a remedy for its violation [and that] . . . 
  
 55. 76 F.3d at 429 n. 12. 
 56. And, as I have suggested previously, it is incorrect to think of the Wenners rule as requiring case 
law support, as it is not really a common law rule. 
 57. To the contrary, Title VII – like New Hampshire’s Whistleblower’s Protection Act and Con-
sumer Protection Act – includes a saving clause.  According to that provision:  
 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liabil-
ity, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or po-
litical subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the 
doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964). 
 58. Smith, 76 F.3d at 429 n. 11. 
 59. 794 F. Supp. at 1182. 
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the availability of remedies under Title VII precludes a wrongful discharge 
action premised on sexual harassment.”60  Judge Devine disagreed, and 
denied the motion to dismiss, pointing out that the defendants’ “argument . 
. . ignore[d] the clarification in Cloutier that the public policy exceptions 
[supporting a wrongful discharge claim] may be either statutory or non-
statutory in nature.”61  While Judge Devine framed the issue in Godfrey in 
terms of the source of the public policy supporting a wrongful discharge 
claim, as opposed to the availability or exclusivity of a statutory remedy, it 
is easy to see why Smith’s footnote eleven cast Godfrey onto the scrap 
heap; its result is directly the opposite of that reached in Smith, which was 
another Title VII case. 
Kopf, however, is another story.  The plaintiff in Kopf was terminated 
from his employment by the defendant when he was fifty-eight years old, 
approximately four months after he injured himself in a non-work-related 
fall from a ladder.62  He sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 198763 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)64 
and also asserted state law claims for, inter alia, wrongful termination.65  
The defendant employer moved to dismiss, and Judge Devine granted the 
motion as to the wrongful termination claim, explaining that “[f]or at least 
fifteen years, New Hampshire courts have indicated that disability or age 
are not acts that an employee performs or refuses to perform and thus fail 
to meet the public policy benchmark.”66  Based upon Judge Devine’s faith-
ful adherence to Howard, and Wenners’ reliance upon that same case, there 
appears to be no extent to which Kopf runs afoul of Wenners (or Smith) 
and, therefore, it is difficult to see why Kopf was sent off to sleep with the 
scraps.67 
  
 60. Id. at 1187. 
 61. Id. (citing Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1141 (N.H. 1981)). 
 62. 882 F. Supp. at 1186-87. 
 63. Id. at 1186 (citing Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. 
(1985))). 
 64. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 
(Supp. 1994))). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1189-90 (citing Howard, 414 A.2d at 1274). 
 67. It is equally difficult to see how the reasoning Judge Devine employed in Kopf would not also 
have supported dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim in Godfrey, but that is a question for another 
day. 
  Also for another day is a deeper analysis of the cast of characters who litigated Godfrey and 
Wenners.  The defendant in Godfrey was represented by Attorney Edward M. Kaplan who argued, 
unsuccessfully, that “a wrongful discharge claim cannot be premised upon a public policy embodied in 
a statute which provides a remedy for its violation.”  794 F. Supp. at 1187.  It would seem to be less 
than coincidental, then, that it was Attorney David L. Nixon – Attorney Kaplan’s opponent in Godfrey 
– who argued for the defendant in Wenners that “where a statutory remedy exists, no common law 
cause of action can lie.”  663 A.2d at 625.  And, perhaps even more interestingly, an argument that 
Attorney Kaplan could likely have won with while representing the defendant in Godfrey, that possess-
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IV. WENNERS’ TWO SHADOWS 
At least partially as a result of the First Circuit’s opinion in Smith, the 
story of Wenners is a tale of two shadows; application of Wenners has re-
sulted in the dismissal of a common law cause of action in no fewer than 
seven published and unpublished opinions of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Hampshire, while across the river, in the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, defendants relying upon Wenners to se-
cure dismissal of a common law cause of action have been uniformly un-
successful. 
A. Among the Federales 
In the district court, the shadow cast by Wenners, as illuminated by 
Smith, is large and somewhat complicated; in one case, Wenners was held 
not to bar a state claim for wrongful termination while in seven others, 
three different rationales, each rooted in Wenners and/or Smith, have been 
used to foreclose state common law claims for wrongful termination. 
1. State Claim not Barred in Miller 
In a district court case decided after Smith was argued, but before the 
opinion was issued, Judge Devine was confronted with a plaintiff who 
claimed she was terminated in violation of Title VII and the ADA, and 
who also brought state claims for wrongful termination and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.68  Specifically, she claimed that her em-
ployer “discriminated against her on the basis of her association with her 
oldest son, who has Down’s Syndrome.”69  Regarding her wrongful termi-
nation claim, she alleged that “she was terminated, in part, because she 
requested time off from work in order to accompany her disabled child to 
speech therapy,”70 an act which, in her view, was “encouraged by the pub-
lic policy articulated in the preamble to the ADA and in the Family and 
Medical Leave Act.”71  The defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful 
termination claim, arguing that the plaintiff “failed to state a viable public 
policy claim as the alleged ‘public policy’ derive[d] from . . . her status as 
mother of a disabled child.”72   
  
ing a particular status is not an act that public policy would encourage, was used against him, success-
fully, when he represented the plaintiff in Kopf. 
 68. Miller v. CBC Cos., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (D.N.H. 1995).   
 69. Id. at 1058-59. 
 70. Id. at 1065 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
 72. Id. at 1065-66. 
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In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Devine quoted the 
rule from Wenners that “a plaintiff may not pursue a common law remedy 
where the legislature intended to replace it with a statutory cause of ac-
tion,”73 and derived from Wenners the same rule that was stated in Smith: 
“Such an intent [to replace a common law remedy] is indicated when a 
statute provides a remedy for its violation and sets forth procedures for 
pursuing such action.”74  Judge Devine went on to note that neither Title 
VII nor the ADA provided remedies under the facts that plaintiff alleged75 
– termination for requesting time off to take her disabled son to speech 
therapy – and he took great care to distinguish the plaintiff in his case, who 
alleged she was terminated for performing a specific act, from the plaintiff 
in Kopf, who based his wrongful termination claim on his status rather than 
an act he performed.76  Finally, in addition to ruling that the plaintiff’s 
wrongful termination claim was not barred by the rule in Wenners, Judge 
Devine went on to rule that despite the fact that Congress had yet to pass 
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1995 (“FMLA”) at the time the 
plaintiff was terminated, “a reasonable juror could conclude that at that 
time in New Hampshire a nonstatutory public policy existed that would 
protect employees seeking leave to take care of their disabled children.”77 
2. Echoes of Howard in Cooper and Jaffe 
In both Cooper v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc.78 and Jaffe v. Catholic 
Medical Center,79 wrongful termination claims were dismissed in opinions 
that paid due homage to Wenners and Smith, but were rooted much more 
firmly in the reasoning of Howard. 
Cooper involved a terminated employee who brought suit under Title I 
of the ADA, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the common law of 
wrongful termination.80  Apparently believing that the availability of reme-
dies under the ADA and the FMLA precluded her wrongful termination 
claim, the plaintiff explained that “her wrongful termination claim [was] 
not predicated on her claims that she was discharged because of her per-
ceived disability and in retaliation for taking leave,”81 arguing, to the con-
trary, that her employer “violated public policy by soliciting and exagger-
  
 73. Id. at 1066 (quoting Wenners, 663 A.2d at 625) (quotations omitted). 
 74. Id. (citing Wenners, 663 A.2d at 625). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1066 n. 18. 
 77. Id. at 1066. 
 78. 6 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.N.H. 1998). 
 79. 2002 WL 31466416 (D.N.H. Nov. 4, 2002). 
 80. 6 F. Supp. 2d at 111. 
 81. Id. at 115. 
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ating the complaints against her”82 by various customers, which, in the 
employer’s view, justified Cooper’s termination.83  Judge Devine dis-
missed the wrongful termination claim, on grounds that “Cooper [had] not 
identified an act on her part that public policy would encourage.”84  In so 
ruling, the judge noted that “[t]he second element [of a wrongful termina-
tion claim], which Cooper ignores, requires that the employee performed a 
protected act,”85 and he reiterated the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s 
rejection of the idea that an employee’s status, rather than her actions, 
could support a wrongful termination claim.86  Cooper’s claim failed be-
cause she, like so many other wrongful termination plaintiffs, focused on 
the ways in which her employer’s actions, rather than her own, allegedly 
violated public policy. 
Because Judge Devine dismissed Cooper’s claim for failing to allege 
that she had performed a protected act, he had no need to apply the rule 
stated in Wenners.  Nonetheless, he turned to Smith, and imported into his 
opinion Smith’s misstatement of Wenners: “The United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit has stated that under New Hampshire law, the 
existence of [a statutory] remedy precludes . . . a common law claim for 
wrongful discharge.”87  As I have already explained, the idea that a com-
mon law cause of action is precluded by the mere existence of a statutory 
remedy, rather than an expression of legislative intent to replace a common 
law cause of action, was proposed by the plaintiff in Wenners, but was not 
the holding of the Wenners Court, which stated a more stringent rule, re-
quiring “clear statutory intent to supplant the common law cause of ac-
tion.”88   
In Jaffe, Judge DiClerico reached a result similar to that reached by 
Judge Devine in Cooper.  The plaintiff in Jaffe, a discharged physician, 
sued under the ADA and brought pendent state law claims alleging breach 
of contract and wrongful termination.89  In his wrongful termination claim, 
the plaintiff alleged 
that he was fired in bad faith or “in violation of the public policy 
that governs employer-employee relations generally and that gov-
erns such relationships when the employee, like plaintiff, is a doc-
  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 111-12. 
 84. Id. at 115. 
 85. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting Smith, 76 F.3d at 429) (internal quotations omitted). 
 88. Wenners, 663 A.2d at 625 (citations omitted). 
 89. 2002 WL 31466416 at *1. 
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tor who has patients that may be affected by the employer’s 
wrongful conduct.”90 
The plaintiff further elaborated his public policy argument, asserting that 
he was terminated 
without regard to the policy that militates against such a termina-
tion due to its affect [sic] upon a doctor’s relationship with his pa-
tients, in an improper attempt to “steal” plaintiff’s practice from 
him by taking advantage of plaintiff’s health problems and per-
ceived physical issues to concoct a reason to trigger the termina-
tion clause in the contract.91   
After noting that the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the defendants’ at-
tempt to steal patients was not included in the complaint, Judge DiClerico 
ruled that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because he did not “allege 
facts that show that he was terminated because he performed a protected 
act or refused to do something that public policy would condemn.”92  Like 
Judge Devine in Cooper, Judge DiClerico stated, but did not rely upon, the 
Smith panel’s misstatement of Wenners.93 
3. Nedder and Dube: Two Horses of a Different Color 
In contrast to Cooper and Jaffe, two cases in which the correct reason-
ing was used to reach the right result, Nedder v. Rivier College94 and Dube 
v. Hadco Corp.95 are cases in which Judge Devine reached the correct re-
sult, but for the wrong reasons. 
In Nedder, a former college professor claimed she was fired because of 
her obesity.96  She sued under the ADA, and pressed pendant state claims 
for breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and violation of New Hamp-
shire’s Law Against Discrimination.97  In the section of his order dismiss-
ing the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim, Judge Devine did not rely on 
the plaintiff’s failure to allege an act on her part that triggered her termina-
tion, despite his previous discussion of the distinction in New Hampshire 
law between terminations based upon an employee’s acts, which can give 
  
 90. Id. at *2 (quoting Compl. ¶ 46). 
 91. Id. at *3 (quoting Obj. ¶ 18). 
 92. Id. (citing Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763, 774 (N.H. 2002)). 
 93. Id. at *2 (“A plaintiff may not maintain a New Hampshire wrongful discharge claim if the same 
claim is addressed by a statutory cause of action such as the ADA.”) (citing Cooper, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 
115; Smith, 76 F.3d at 429). 
 94. 944 F. Supp. 111 (D.N.H. 1996). 
 95. 1999 WL 1210885 (D.N.H. Feb. 4, 1999). 
 96. 944 F. Supp. at 119-20. 
 97. Id. at 113. 
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rise to a wrongful termination claim, and terminations based upon her 
status, which are not actionable under the common law of wrongful termi-
nation.98  Rather, he began by correctly quoting the rule from Wenners,99 
then analogized to Smith,100 and “conclude[d] that Nedder’s wrongful dis-
charge claim [was] precluded because of the availability of a remedy under 
the ADA.”101  But again, Wenners stands for the proposition that legislative 
intent to displace a common law remedy – not the mere creation of a statu-
tory remedy – precludes a wrongful discharge claim, and in stating that 
rule, the Wenners Court never said that the creation of a statutory remedy, 
without more, is sufficient to signal a legislative intent to displace common 
law causes of action.   
Dube is in many ways similar to Nedder.  In Dube, the plaintiff 
brought a Title VII sexual harassment claim along with state claims for 
defamation and wrongful discharge.102  Among other things, Dube claimed 
that she was terminated because she entertained several of her employer’s 
customers – visiting businessmen from Japan – after hours, and because of 
rumors circulating through the company regarding her evening with the 
Japanese businessmen.103  As in Nedder, Judge Devine quoted Smith’s mis-
statement of Wenners104 and used that misstatement to dismiss the plain-
tiff’s claim “[t]o the extent [it was] based upon her contention that her ter-
mination was motivated by gender discrimination.”105 
Rather than relying upon Smith, Judge Devine could have, and proba-
bly should have, turned to the action/status distinction he used to such 
good effect in Cooper.  What makes that omission so curious in Dube is 
the fact that one paragraph after he quoted Smith’s misstatement of Wen-
ners, Judge Devine went down the correct path in analyzing the plaintiff’s 
claim that she had been terminated because she entertained her company’s 
customers after hours: 
In this case Dube, apparently cognizant of the fact that such an ar-
gument could not pass the straight-face test, has not argued in her 
opposition to summary judgment that an identifiable public policy 
exists that would encourage her to go out to dinner with Japanese 
businessmen.106 
  
 98. See Cooper, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
 99. Nedder, 944 F. Supp. at 121. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 1999 WL 1210885 at *1. 
 103. Id. at *3. 
 104. Id. at *9. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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What remains unclear from the opinion in Dube is whether the factual alle-
gations concerning termination for entertaining the Japanese businessmen 
was a part of, or independent from, the plaintiff’s assertion that her termi-
nation was motivated by gender. 
4. Adding Retaliation to the Mix: Phelan, Weeden, and Fernandes 
Cooper, Jaffe, Nedder, and Dube are all cases that were (or should 
have been) decided under the principle enunciated in Howard – wrongful 
termination requires a termination resulting from an employee’s actions, 
not his or her status – or under a traditional wrongful termination analysis 
focusing upon the existence (or lack thereof) of a public policy supporting 
the employee’s action.  In other words, because those cases did not depend 
upon the Wenners rule, any reference to the Smith majority’s misreading of 
Wenners is ultimately insignificant.  But the three cases discussed in this 
section present a different situation, and one in which reliance upon Smith 
is potentially consequential, because Phelan v. Town of Derry,107 Weeden 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,108 and Fernandes v. TPD, Inc.109 all involved 
claims by plaintiffs that they were fired in retaliation for exercising rights 
they enjoyed under federal statutes.  That is, the plaintiffs in these three 
cases all asserted that they were terminated for their actions, not their 
status, and that federal statutes provided the basis for claiming that they 
had acted in accordance with public policy.  Thus, unlike the claims in the 
four cases discussed in the previous two sections, the claims in Phelan, 
Weeden, and Fernandes could not have been dismissed without relying on 
Smith. 
Phelan involved a claim brought under the FMLA along with state 
claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.110  As Judge DiClerico described the arguments regarding a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings filed by one of the defendants: 
The Library contends that the FMLA preempts Phelan’s state 
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge based upon 
her allegations that she was fired for exercising her rights under the 
FMLA.  Phelan argues that the FMLA was not intended to sup-
plant existing state law remedies so that her FMLA claim does not 
preclude her wrongful discharge claim based on FMLA rights.111 
  
 107. 1998 WL 1285898 (D.N.H. Dec. 9, 1998). 
 108. 1999 WL 1209494 (D.N.H. May 25, 1999). 
 109. 2000 WL 1466108 (D.N.H. Jan. 7, 2000). 
 110. 1998 WL 1285898 at *1. 
 111. Id. at *2 (footnote omitted). 
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Judge DiClerico disagreed: “Phelan’s objection to preclusion is contrary to 
settled law.”112  Interestingly, Phelan identified the correct test – legislative 
intent to supplant common law remedies, rather than the existence of a 
statutory remedy – but in ruling that Phelan’s “state law claim for retalia-
tory discharge [was] precluded by the remedy afforded by the FMLA,”113 
Judge DiClerico noted: 
The statutory language Phelan cites does not support her argument.  
The cited provisions state that the FMLA is not to be construed to 
supersede state or local law providing greater leave rights than the 
FMLA but the provisions are silent as to state law remedies ad-
dressing violations of the FMLA.114 
While one might reasonably argue that Congressional silence regarding the 
replacement of common law remedies suggests that Congress did not in-
tend to displace such remedies, Judge DiClerico’s decision was all but re-
quired by the statement in Smith that the existence of a statutory remedy is 
enough to preclude common law remedies, which is, in turn, based upon 
Smith’s (mis)understanding that under Wenners, the mere creation of a 
statutory remedy is enough to signal legislative intent to supplant common 
law causes of action. 
Like Phelan, Weeden involved an FMLA claim coupled with a wrong-
ful discharge claim in which the plaintiff claimed he was discharged for 
exercising his rights under the FMLA.115  Relying upon his decision in 
Phelan and Judge Devine’s decision in Cooper, Judge DiClerico granted 
the defendant judgment on the pleadings on the wrongful discharge 
claim.116  Three things are noteworthy about the opinion.  First, Judge Di-
Clerico characterized Smith as answering “the question of whether [a 
wrongful discharge] cause of action lies where, as here, the public policy at 
stake is codified in a statute that itself provides a private right of action to 
remedy transgressions.”117  Second, after paraphrasing the holding from 
Phelan, “that a wrongful discharge cause of action does not lie where the 
claim arises from an employer’s retaliatory termination of an employee for 
exercising her rights under the FMLA,”118 Judge DiClerico went on to note 
  
 112. Id. at *2 (citing Cooper, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 115; Smith, 76 F.3d at 429; Wenners, 663 A.2d 623; 
Gearhart v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1278 (D. Kan. 1998); Vargo-Adams v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 992 F. Supp. 939, 944 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Hamros v. Bethany Homes, 894 F. Supp. 1176, 
1179 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). 
 113. Phelan, 1998 WL 1285898 at *2. 
 114. Id. at *2 n. 2 (emphasis in the original). 
 115. 1999 WL 1209494 at *3 n. 1. 
 116. Id. at *4. 
 117. Id. at *3 (quoting Smith, 76 F.3d at 428-29). 
 118. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Cooper, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 115). 
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that “[t]o the extent that New Hampshire superior courts hold to the con-
trary, the court finds such holdings unpersuasive.”119  Finally, in response 
to the plaintiff’s argument “that under Wenners, a court must consider 
whether the legislature intended to supplant a common law remedy with a 
statutory remedy,”120 Judge DiClerico, adopting the reasoning of Smith, 
explained: “In this case the factors considered by the Wenners court would 
indicate a clear intent to supplant.  The FMLA not only provides a statu-
tory prohibition, but it also provides a remedy and procedures for pursuing 
statutory violations.”121  While Judge DiClerico could have construed Wen-
ners differently, i.e., as identifying several factors that demonstrate the lack 
of a legislative intent to preclude rather than stating a test for determining 
whether the legislature did intend to preclude common law remedies, a 
more correct reading of Wenners was fairly well foreclosed by Smith. 
In light of Phelan and Weeden, Fernandes is an unremarkable opinion.  
In that case, Judge DiClerico construed the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge 
claim “as one for retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII”122 and then 
dismissed it, with little discussion, as precluded by Smith and Cooper.123  
In so doing, he characterized Smith as holding that “[a] plaintiff may not 
seek a common law remedy for wrongful termination under New Hamp-
shire law where the same claim is addressed by a statutory cause of action 
such as Title VII.”124 
The shadow cast in the district court by Smith’s interpretation of Wen-
ners is long and dark.  In Nedder and Dube, the siren song of Smith in-
spired Judge Devine to bypass the correct grounds for dismissal, and in 
Phelan, Weeden, and Fernandes, Smith’s misreading of Wenners supported 
the dismissal of claims that probably should not have been dismissed. 
B. Meanwhile, Back in the State Courts 
While New Hampshire’s United States District Court has dismissed no 
fewer than seven wrongful termination claims, and at least three of them in 
direct reliance upon Smith, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has gone in 
the opposite direction, ever narrowing the circumstances in which a statu-
tory cause of action deprives a plaintiff of a common law claim. 
  
 119. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 120. Id. at *3 n. 2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Fernandes, 2000 WL 1466108 at *7. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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In Powell v. Catholic Medical Center,125 the first New Hampshire Su-
preme Court opinion to call into question the scope of Wenners, the plain-
tiff was a phlebotomist employed by Catholic Medical Center who was 
assaulted and injured by a patient from whom she attempted to draw 
blood.126  She sued both the hospital and the patient’s treating physician, 
and won a jury verdict, on a common law claim of failure to warn.127  On 
appeal, the defendants argued “that the plaintiff’s common law duty to 
warn claim was preempted by RSA 329:31.”128  The defendants relied 
upon the following portion of that statute: 
A physician licensed under this chapter has a duty to warn of, or to 
take reasonable precautions to provide protection from, a client’s 
violent behavior when the client has communicated to such physi-
cian a serious threat of physical violence against a clearly identi-
fied or reasonably identifiable victim or victims, or a serious threat 
of substantial damage to real property.129 
After quoting the rule from Wenners, the Supreme Court held that the 
foregoing “statutory language does not evidence an ‘intent to replace’ the 
common law claim in this case.”130  Rather, in the view of the Court, “the 
statute does not explicitly preempt all common law claims for a physi-
cian’s failure to warn [but] merely preempts the common law claims ad-
dressed by its language,”131 while leaving intact all other common law 
claims, such as the one in that case, where the defendants were charged 
with knowledge of the patient’s general dangerousness, but “the patient did 
not communicate an intent to harm an identified or identifiable victim.”132 
What is interesting about Powell is its rejection of the plaintiff’s argu-
ment that N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 329:31 implicitly preempted the common 
law cause of action.133  According to the Court, the statute concerned “a 
physician’s duty to warn of a client’s violent behavior when the client has 
communicated a serious threat of physical violence against a clearly identi-
fied or reasonably identifiable victim”134 but, through its silence regarding 
threats posed by dangerous patients who do not communicate threats 
against identifiable victims, left untouched any common law cause of ac-
  
 125. 749 A.2d 301 (N.H. 2000). 
 126. Id. at 303. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 304 (quoting N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 329:31 (I) (1995)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 304-05. 
 134. Id. at 305. 
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tion that might be available to those injured by such patients.  Rather than 
adopting the defendants’ theory that N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 329:31 implic-
itly repealed the common law,135 the Court relied upon the doctrine of field 
preemption,136 and identified the preempted field not as physician respon-
sibility for injuries inflicted by their dangerous patients, but as physician 
responsibility for injuries inflicted by their dangerous patients who have 
identified the potential targets of their violent acts.137  The Court’s use of a 
preemption analysis (and its narrow framing of the preempted field) pro-
vide an interesting contrast to Smith, in which the First Circuit made due 
without a formal preemption analysis and required only “a private right of 
action [and] . . . a mature procedure for pursuing such an action”138 to sig-
nal legislative intent to displace a common law remedy.139 
The trend begun in Powell reached its zenith in Bliss v. Stow Mills, 
Inc.,140 another case from the familiar realm of wrongful discharge.  In 
Bliss, a truck driver was terminated after refusing to run a particular route 
he claimed was too long to be completed within the time limits mandated 
by the federal Surface Transportation and Assistance Act of 1982 
(“STAA”), and threatening to tell federal authorities about the allegedly 
unlawful route.141  The driver sued, asserting, inter alia, a common law 
claim for wrongful discharge.142  The trial court dismissed the wrongful 
discharge claim on grounds that it was preempted by the STAA.143  As the 
Supreme Court explained the operation of the STAA:  
In order to encourage the reporting of safety violations, the STAA 
affords drivers who refuse to break the law or drive vehicles they 
believe to be unsafe some degree of protection from retaliatory ac-
tions by employers.  See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 
252, 258 (1987); 49 U.S.C. § 31105.  Section 31105 of the STAA 
states: 
  
 135. Id. at 304. 
 136. Id. at 305 (citing Boston & Me. R.R., 86 A. at 359). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Smith, 76 F.3d at 429. 
 139. Id.  It is tempting to speculate that the Smith majority, which turned a negative statement from 
the dictum in Wenners into an affirmative rule, would have determined, if faced with the facts of Pow-
ell, that the legislature’s determination to impose a duty upon physicians to warn of threats to identifi-
able victims also indicated its intention to relieve physicians of any duty to warn when a potentially 
dangerous patient did not communicate a threat, or communicated a threat that was not directed toward 
identifiable victims. 
 140. 786 A.2d 815 (N.H. 2001). 
 141. Id. at 816. 
 142. Id. at 817. 
 143. Id. 
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(a) Prohibitions. – (1) A person may not discharge an em-
ployee, or discipline or discriminate against an employee re-
garding pay, terms, or privileges of employment, because – 
(A) the employee, or another person at the employee’s request, 
has filed a complaint or begun a proceeding related to a viola-
tion of a commercial motor vehicle safety regulation, standard, 
or order, or has testified or will testify in such a proceeding; or 
(B) the employee refuses to operate a vehicle because –  
(i) the operation violates a regulation, standard, or order of 
the United States related to commercial motor vehicle 
safety or health; or 
(ii) the employee has a reasonable apprehension of serious 
injury to the employee or the public because of the vehi-
cle's unsafe condition. 
An employee who alleges a violation of subsection (a) “may file a 
complaint with the Secretary of Labor not later than 180 days after 
the alleged violation occurred.”  49 U.S.C. § 31105(b).  Section 
31105 provides the procedures to be followed should an employee 
file such a complaint.144 
Despite the fact that the STAA “codifies the public policy”145 in favor of 
reporting unsafe interstate trucking practices and “also creates a private 
right of action to remedy violations of that policy and limns a mature pro-
cedure for pursuing such an action,”146 the Supreme Court flatly rejected 
“the defendant’s argument that where a statutory remedy exists, no com-
mon law cause of action can lie.”147  Moreover, it did so after conducting a 
full-scale preemption analysis, explaining: “our preemption analysis in-
cludes a detailed examination of the express and implied intent of Con-
gress and we find it unnecessary to revisit the same issue under the com-
mon law rule cited in Wenners.”148 
The one-paragraph disposition of the defendant’s Wenners argument in 
Bliss is noteworthy for several reasons.  First, Bliss stands Wenners on its 
head.  In Wenners, the Court dealt first with the defendants’ statutory pre-
clusion argument and then turned to their preemption argument.  By con-
trast, in Bliss, the Court first considered the preemption argument and then 
turned to statutory preclusion.  More importantly, by ruling that its pre-
  
 144. Id. (parallel citations omitted). 
 145. Smith, 76 F.3d at 429. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Bliss, 786 A.2d at 820. 
 148. Id. 
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emption analysis also disposed of the defendant’s preclusion argument, the 
Court answered a question that was left open in Wenners, namely what 
constitutes a sufficient showing of legislative intent to replace a common 
law remedy with a statutory cause of action.  The Bliss Court’s answer, 
that statutory preclusion is demonstrated by the same showing necessary to 
establish preemption, would appear to be the death knell for Smith, in 
which the First Circuit established a considerably lower threshold for statu-
tory preclusion than the standard for preemption.  Because of the saving 
provision in Title VII, that statute could not possibly be construed as pre-
empting state anti-discrimination law, and, following the reasoning of 
Bliss, if Congress did not intend to preempt state law, it could not have 
intended to replace state common law remedies with a statutory cause of 
action.  In short, the conclusion is inescapable that Bliss consigns Smith to 
the scrap heap and, in all likelihood, rehabilitates Godfrey. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
If nothing else, the twisted history of Wenners and Smith demonstrates 
the mischief inherent in ill-considered dictum.  In both cases, and several 
more in the Wenners-Smith line, there was no need to plow the ground 
covered by the Wenners rule because the plaintiffs’ wrongful termination 
claims failed for a more fundamental reason: failure to allege an act on the 
part of the plaintiff that was supported by public policy.  Had Wenners 
been decided on that basis, as it should have been, then perhaps the Smith 
majority would not have been inspired to craft the rule that was ultimately 
undone by Bliss.  So, on the one hand, Wenners and Smith may be faulted 
for saying too much.  But, on the other hand, Wenners might also be 
faulted for saying too little, when it identified “no clear statutory intent to 
supplant the common law cause of action”149 in the case before it but never 
went on to discuss precisely what evidence would indicate a “clear statu-
tory intent.”  The silence on that point in Wenners explains, to some extent, 
why the Smith majority took on the task of mining Wenners for the addi-
tional nuggets of dictum from which it constructed its now discredited test.  
So, to conclude, the real lesson of the Wenners-Smith line of cases would 
seem to be a variation on Goldilocks and the three bears: some opinions 
say too much, and some opinions say too little, while the best opinions are 
those that say neither too much nor too little and in so doing, get it just 
right. 
  
 149. 663 A.2d at 625. 
